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quences for him if he withheld the information? It might also be relevant to ask 
what morally upright people are expected to do or have done when in similar 
circumstances. Must such an inquiry at least tacitly presuppose indeterminism? 
Compatibilists are likely to argue that here the relevant sense of 'have no choice 
about' is different from that applicable to events prior to people's appearance 
on earth, and that this weakens the apparent analogy between rule B and its 
logical counterparts. Certainly van Inwagen could argue forcefully against this 
line; his book contains some of the resources for doing so. His case against 
compatibilism could have been even stronger if he had explicitly brought them 
to bear here. 
With van Inwagen's chapter on what it would mean for us not to have free 
will and with his points, in the final chapter, about determinism, I am largely 
in agreement. He argues plausibly that it is inconsistent for someone who delib-
erates (as every remotely normal person does) to hold that we do not have free 
will, e.g. because of the truth of hard determinism (determinism conjoined with 
incompatibilism). His discussion of how scientific progress might bear on the 
credibility of determinism is also valuable. If he does not establish incom-
patibilism, his book comes at least as close to doing so as any I know. Com-
patibilists must try to reckon with it; incompatibilists must master its arguments; 
and serious students of the free will problem, whatever their position on the 
issues, must welcome it. * 
*For helpful comments on an earlier version of this review I am grateful to William P. Alston, 
Larry Hohm, Terance Horgan, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Michael Zimmerman. 
Evil and a Good God, by Bruce R. Reichenbach. New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1982. Pp. ix and 198. $9.00. 
Reviewed by CLEMENT DORE, Vanderbilt University. 
Chapters 1, 2 and 4 of Professor Reichenbach's book, which, with Chapter 5, 
contain Reichenbach's critique of the atheistic argument from evil, are best 
considered as a clear and helpful (though overly repetitive) introduction to recent 
literature on the problem of evil by, e.g., Plantinga, Rowe and Adams.! In what 
follows, I shall discuss some problems which are raised by Chapters 2, 4 and 5. 
Much of Reichenbach's Chapter 2, which is on the inductive form of the 
argument from evil, is summarized by Reichenbach as follows: "the atheologian's 
argument claims that instances of suffering which are seemingly or apparently 
pointless are in fact or likely pointless, for we do not know of any higher good 
to which they are a means. But this constitutes an appeal to ignorance; that we 
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know of no higher good does not entail that there is no higher good or that one 
is unlikely." But surely it is not true of every denial of the claim that something 
is a means to a higher good that it "constitutes an appeal to ignorance." Suppose, 
for example, that you tell me that my scratching my head on Tuesdays (or my 
whistling on Wednesdays, etc.) is a means to an enormously valuable end. 
Clearly there would be an onus on you to prove what you say, rather than on 
me to disprove it. And we need to be told why this does not hold true of the 
claim that suffering is a means to an undiscemible, valuable end. 
An essential claim in Chapter 4 (Theodicy for Moral Evils) is that it is better 
than not that there are free moral agents, i.e., beings who have a capacity for 
wrongdoing, even though they sometimes exercise that capacity. Now no doubt 
it is better than not that we can freely choose to engage in supererogatory actions. 
Moreover, I will grant (what I think is doubtful) that it is better than not that 
we can freely choose to fulfill obligations which are not highly stringent. But 
can it seriously be supposed that I would be better off if I had a capacity for, 
e.g., raping children, which I freely refrained from exercising? Reichenbach 
may think that, as things stand, I do have such a capacity and that-since in 
fact I don't rape children-it is good that I have it. But I submit that having a 
capacity for engaging in a morally monstrous way involves having at least some 
slight inclination to behave in that way. If that inclination is not present, then, 
though one may be physically able to engage in the monstrous act, one is not 
psychologically able to perform it, and, hence, he is not able simpliciter. But is 
it really the case that having the envisaged inclination is a good thing? Surely 
just the opposite is true: having an inclination to rape children (to commit 
genocide, etc.) is a severe character defect, which is such that anyone who 
suffers from it would be vastly better off without it. 
I do not want to deny that it may well be better than not that people who 
exercise their capacity for grave wrongdoing have a capacity for not doing so. 
But it does not follow that it may also be better than not that people who exercise 
their capacity for doing good have a capacity for vicious conduct as well. 
I have two objections to Chapter 5 (Theodicy for Natural Evils). 
(I) Reichenbach appears to be claiming that, for all the atheist can prove to 
the contrary, the operation of any set of scientific laws on any matter which a 
universe contains will be at least as pain-producing as is the operation of the 
scientific laws which are in fact in place on the matter which the universe in 
fact contains. But on whom is the onus of proof here? If Reichenbach's reason 
for going beyond the putative, highly formalistic refutation of the deductive form 
of the argument from evil (Chapter 1), and the equally formalistic refutation of 
the inductive form of that argument (Chapter 2), is not to assume the onus of 
refuting the atheist by an appeal to hypotheses for which there is evidence, then 
it is far from clear what Reichenbach's purpose might be. 
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(2) Following F. R. Tennant, Reichenbach claims that the world must be run 
mainly by natural laws, rather than by God's direct actions, if there are to be 
free moral agents. His argument is that if God constantly intervened to prevent 
natural evil, then we could never calculate the probable consequences of our 
actions. Reichenbach appears to be thinking here about a world which, though 
governed by natural laws, is subject to God's frequent intervention. And what 
he says about that world may well be right. But now what about a world which 
is entirely governed by God's direct action? Why couldn't God make such a 
world at least as predictable as our own? It is no doubt true that if God, in the 
course of directly governing a world, did not give any of his creatures a capacity 
for doing what is morally wrong, then a fortiori free moral agency would be 
impossible in that world. But, given that free will defenders are right about the 
importance of free will, why wouldn't God give some of his creatures that 
capacity? Why can't the envisaged God-governed world contain at least as much 
free moral agency as our own? And if it can, then why isn't this world superior 
to our own, in that it would contain no natural (as opposed to moral) evil? 
Perhaps Reichenbach will want to reply here that, not only must any law-governed 
world contain natural evil, but this is true as well of any worlds which are run 
by God's direct action. But it looks very much as though that claim is incompatible 
with God's omnipotence. 
NOTE 
I. Also, the essence of Reichenbach's argument on pp. 70-73 can be found in my "An Examination 
of the Soul-Making Theodicy," American Philosophical Quarterly, April, 1970 and "Plantinga on 
the Free Will Defense," The Review of Metaphysics, June, 1971. 
Doxology: The Praise of God in Worship, Doctrine, and Life, by Geoffrey 
Wainwright. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pp. 609. Cloth, $35.00. 
Reviewed by JAMES WM. McCLENDON, JR., CDSP/GTU, Berkeley, CA 
94709. 
The major problems facing Christian theology in the Western world at the present 
time-problems neither new or transient but persisting since the Enlightenment 
or earlier-may be summarized under the headings of relevance (the gap between 
the modes of thought available to theology and those prevailing in the wider 
society), pluralism (the conscious plurality of world religions, but also the 
ongoing plurality within Christianity itself) and (inclusive of these two) truth or 
truthfulness (the question, whether any existing theology may be judged true by 
